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Abstract1, 2 
In recent years there has been growing interest in including estimates of 
„intangible‟ capital, such as knowledge, skills, and institutions, in national asset 
accounting. In accordance with these efforts, this paper attempts to provide 
the first worldwide evaluations of „social‟ institutions, understood as the norms 
and networks that reduce transaction costs and enable collective action, as a 
proportion of national wealth. Using a new dataset that combines over 200 
items from 25 sources, a composite of indices – measuring intergroup 
cohesion, gender equity, the strength of local community, the extent of crime 
and interpersonal trust, and levels of civic engagement – is formed and used to 
explain variance in the intangible capital residual, the proportion of national 
income that is left over after physical and natural capital have been accounted 
for. We show that social institutions are one of the main components of 
national wealth and a major productive asset for societies and their constituent 
communities around the world.  
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Social Institutions as a Form of Intangible Capital 
 
1 Introduction 
In recent years there has been growing interest in including estimates of 
„intangible‟ capital, such as knowledge, skills, and institutions, in national asset 
accounting. Intangible capital encompasses human capital, which includes the 
sum of the knowledge, skills, and know-how possessed by population as well 
as the level of trust in a society and the quality of its formal and informal social 
institutions (World Bank, 2006). The majority of wealth in the world lays in the 
form of intangible capital- an amalgam including human and social capital, 
which reflects the quality of formal and informal institutions. Intangible wealth 
– human, institutional and social capital – contributes 59-80% of social welfare, 
and the relative contribution rises with income across all regions and income 
classes (Hamilton and Ruta, 2006). Rich countries are largely rich because of 
the skills of their populations and the quality of the institutions supporting 
economic activity. This is well reflected in the relationship between natural 
capital and income. The share of natural capital in total wealth tends to fall 
with income, while the share of intangible capital rises (World Bank, 2006). 
Thus, using a panel dataset with observations for 115 countries for the years 
1995, 2000 and 2005, Ferreira and Hamilton (2010) show that the shares of 
produced, natural and intangible capital in production are 32%, 7% and 18% 
respectively. However, when the sample was limited to OECD countries, the 
only statistically significant factor of production was intangible capital, with a 
50% share. The findings reinforce the fact that intangible factors, rather than 
produced or natural capital, are the principal sources of consumption growth 
in high-income countries. Labor productivity, which is comparatively high in 
the western developed countries, can be attributed to higher intangible capital. 
Investment on intangible capital has shown to have a positive impact on labor 
productivity. Using international comparable data on intangible capital 
investment by business within a panel analysis from 1995-2005 in EU-15 
country, Roth and Thum (2010), show a positive and significant relationship 
between intangible capital investment by business and labor productivity 
growth. 
 
As well as having a major impact upon labor productivity and rates of 
economic growth, intangible capital has an important role in reducing levels of 
absolute and relative poverty.  Minh Quang Dao (2008) shows that the fraction 
of the population below the poverty line is linearly dependent upon a range of 
human capital variables, including the gender parity ratio in primary and 
secondary schools, and the maternal mortality rate. Using another sample of 35 
developing countries, he also finds that income inequality linearly depends on 
the same explanatory variables plus the infant mortality rate and the primary 
school completion rate, which suggests that both relative as well as absolute 
poverty depend upon human capital accumulation. Specific country and 
regional studies have suggested similar conclusions, for example in Nigeria 
(Okunmadewa 2005), Pakistan (Kurosaki and Khan, 2001), the Philippines 
(Asian Development Bank, 2005), or Ghana (Rolleston, 2009). Further studies 
have also shown that not only human capital, but also other aspects of social 
norms and behavior, commonly referred to as „social‟ or „cultural‟ capital, are 
critical in explaining why certain groups are able to exit poverty more rapidly 
than others. Narayan and Pritchett (1997) report findings from a study of 6,000 
people living in 87 villages in Tanzania, showing that a one standard deviation 
increase in village-level social capital predicts a 20 to 30 percent increase in 
expenditure per person, for each household in the village. In a follow-up 
publication, Narayan and Pritchett (1999) explain this statistical relationship by 
arguing that higher group membership rates imply more enjoyment of public 
services, the use of more advanced agricultural practices, joining in communal 
activities, and participation in credit programs. Other scholars have suggested 
further mechanisms linking social institutions and poverty reduction, including 
norms of gender equity (Van Staveren, 2003) tolerance and trust (Knack and 
Keefer 1997, Tabellini 2010), or attitudes to work and saving (Inglehart 1997).  
 
2 Theoretical Overview 
Intangible capital is the difference between total wealth and the sum of 
produced and natural capital and is calculated as a residual. Solow‟s residual 
and Tobin‟s Q are the most famous examples used. Solow's Residual measures 
the actual productivity which cannot be attributed to labor or capital 
accumulation and has to be attributed to technology. Tobin‟s Q is the ratio of 
the market value of a company versus the recorded asset value with the 
difference attributed to intangibles. The intangible capital residual includes all 
assets that are neither natural nor produced, and includes both human and 
social capital that are not accounted in wealth estimates. In other words, it 
consists of all forms of capital not immediately manifested in tangible matter 
(Webster and Jensen, 2006). Webster and Jensen argue that, since the stock of 
available tangible matter is fixed, the sole source of productivity growth and 
the only way to enhance the (material) quality of life must be through the 
growth and deployment of intangible capital in the production process.  
According to Cummins (2004), although intangible capital is not a distinct 
factor as is physical capital or labor, it is the “glue,” that creates value from 
other factor inputs. Goldfinger (1997) acknowledges the role of intangible 
assets in wealth creation and argues that, the creation and manipulation of the 
intangible assets to be the source of economic value and wealth rather than the 
production of material goods. As the sustainable competitive advantage of a 
nation is to a large extent dependent on the possession of relevant capability 
differentials, having a larger stock of capability differentials in the form of 
intangible capital - better human resources and social institutions - could in 
part help answer the question as to why some countries have more sustained 
economic growth and development, whereas others do not. 
 
2.1 The Valuation of Intangible Capital 
We distinguish between two kinds of intangibles that contribute to the residual: 
human capital and social institutions, or social capital. For the purpose of this 
study, we define human capital as the knowledge, skills, and attributes 
possessed by individuals that contribute to personal and societal well-being, 
and social capital as the informal institutions which reduce transaction costs 
and facilitate collective action. Although human capital has often been defined 
and measured with reference to educational attainment, it is a broader concept 
that includes attributes that reflect how various non-cognitive skills and 
attributes contribute to the greater well-being under different socioeconomic 
and cultural conditions. Meanwhile, social capital has variously defined as 
general social trust (Fukuyama 1995), networks of civic engagement (Putnam 
1993), non-discrimination, rule of law (Knack and Keefer, 1997), or communal 
cooperation (Ostrom 2000).  
 
Human capital has been most extensively studied in the form of 
education (Cohen and Soto, 2007; World Bank, 1999; World Bank, 2000, 
Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2004; Kimenyi et. al. 2006; Wigley and 
Akkoyunlu-Wigley, 2006; Vinod and Kaushik, 2007). An investment in 
improving the skills and knowledge of the labor force determines the stock of 
human capital and returns to investment in education.  Psacharopoulos and 
Patrinos (2004) empirically demonstrate the positive returns of investment in 
education. They show that the average rate of return to an additional year of 
schooling is 10 percent and that education produces the highest returns in low 
and middle-income countries. Using time series and panel regressions for data 
on a group of eighteen large developing countries, Vinod and Kaushik (2007), 
empirically demonstrate that human capital has a statistically significant impact 
on economic growth. They cite India as an example where knowledge-based 
industries, notably computer software, telecommunications, pharmaceuticals, 
chemicals, and biotechnology have emerged as a result of sustained investment 
in institutes of higher education. Finally, Anderson and Keys (2007) 
demonstrate that if introduced at a young age education does contribute to 
future earning capacity (Anderson and Keys 2007), while other studies show 
that education also plays role in economic growth (Vinod and Kausik, 2007), 
and promoting social cohesion by reducing ethnic tensions (Gradstein and 
Justman, 2000).  
 
Following Barro and Lee (2000), we measure human capital using the 
average number of years of schooling. This follows an established precedent 
whereby years of schooling has been used as a measure of educational 
achievement (Cohen and Soto, 2001; World Bank, 1999; World Bank, 2000, 
Scarpetta and Visco, 2000; Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2004; Kimenyi, 2006; 
Wigley and Akkoyunlu-Wigley, 2006; Mamuneas et. al. 2006; Vinod and 
Kaushik, 2007). 
 
Following Woolcock and Narayan, we define social capital as the 
norms and networks that enable collective action (Woolcock and Narayan, 
2000). A range of studies have examined the contribution of social institutions 
to economic outcomes. Based on their study of Tsimane‟, a native Amazonian 
society of foragers and farmers in Bolivia, Godoy et. al. (2007) report that 
social capital is positively and significantly associated with private investments 
in social capital, even after controlling for individual-level variables from an 
optimal investment model, spillovers from group social capital, village income 
inequality, and market openness. They also found that village income inequality 
and market openness were negatively associated with private investments in 
social capital. Similar results have been reported by Narayan and Pritchett 
(2002), who show that community level social capital has high and significant 
effects upon per capita income, based upon their sample of 87 villages in 
Tanzania.  
 
Multi-regional and cross-country studies have replicated the results 
cited based on household and village surveys. Using a sample of 20 regions in 
Italy, Helliwell and Putnam (1995) demonstrate that social capital has strong 
and significant relationship with economic growth, reconfirming earlier 
findings by Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti (1993). Knack and Keefer (1997) 
have expanded the study of social institutions and growth to a cross-country 
sample, using data from 29 nations empirically demonstrate the role of 
generalized trust and strength of civic norms on average annual growth in per 
capita income from 1980 to 1992, with the finding that countries with a higher 
starting level of „social trust‟ saw greater subsequent economic expansion. 
Similar studies have been conducted in the growing literature on the 
institutional determinants of growth; Easterly and Levine (1997), for example, 
use a sample of 96 nations to demonstrate that low level of social capital 
resulting from ethno-linguistic fractionalization impacts average annual growth 
in per capita, both directly and indirectly.  
 
3 The Data and Model Estimates 
In our study, we have chosen human capital and social capital as intangibles 
because the two-part taxonomy suits our empirical model and data. As human 
capital has been most widely analyzed in the economics literature among the 
components of intangible capital, it is also included in our study  to see what 
percentage of the variation in the IC residual is explained by human capital (in 
form of number of years of schooling). Although the human capital variable 
does not take into account the quality of education of those trained, it is highly 
unlikely to bias the coefficients, given the high correlation between this 
measure and direct assessments of educational outcomes (Mamuneas et. al. 
2006; Vinod and Kaushik 2007). Following the precedent of World Bank 
(2006), in our study, immigrants settled abroad are considered as a special form 
of human capital. As emigrant workers send money to their families in the form 
of remittances, they are a part of total national wealth even though they are not 
physically present in the country.  We include remittances in our model because 
the workers that choose to immigrate to foreign shores in order to find better 
employment opportunities do send money back to the country of their origin 
to support their families and in some cases own businesses. The variable 
WORKREM in the model is the percentage of migrant remittances ad 
compensation of employees working abroad as a share of GDP, which 
includes all the legal economic flows generated by migrants to their country of 
origin. The role of remittances in influencing development through increase in 
the investment level in the source country has been widely acknowledged 
(Taylor, 1999; Nyberg-Sørenson et al. 2002; Leόn-Ledesma and Piracha, 2004; 
Tewolde, 2005). Emigrants have been known to raise incomes of their families 
at home significantly through remittances (Grubel and Scott, 1966).  
 
Despite the enormous interest in immigrant remittances on economic 
development and income growth in the emigrants‟ country of origin, empirical 
investigations have been limited by the availability of good quality data. It is 
extremely difficult to gather accurate data on remittances because many 
remittances are not channeled through the proper payment system and hence 
do not appear in the official statistics on remittances (Chami et. al. 2005). Due 
to the unavailability of good quality data for cross-country comparisons, most 
study on effects of remittances has been limited to the particular immigrant 
group. As data collected to study the impact of remittances are gathered from 
various sources, conflicting results are reported, which has made extremely 
difficult to draw general inference. For the purpose this study, we use a series 
of aggregate data on remittances and years of schooling from the World Bank‟s 
World Development Indicators (WDI) database.  
 
 
3.1 Social Institutions 
The major innovation of our analysis is to include a composite index of social 
institutions in our decomposition of the intangible capital residual. This 
measure of the „stock‟ of social capital is an index compiled from five sub-
indices, each measuring an aspect of social institutional quality. The source of 
these measures is the Indices of Social Development project hosted at the 
Institute for Social Studies (ISS), which combines 200 items from some 25 
sources into five estimates of how social institutions vary across countries 
(Foa, 2011, Foa and Tanner, 2011). The project adopts a working definition of 
social institutions as the informal norms and conventions that pattern human 
interaction (North, 1991), and among the universe of all social institutions, 
those constitute social capital which serve to reduce transaction costs and enable 
collective action.  
 
Reflecting the definitions of social institutions and social capital, the 
200 items are siloed into five subareas where social norms serve to reduce 
transaction costs and facilitate collective action: crime and social trust, 
intergroup cohesion, gender equity, civic engagement, and strength of local 
community. The first area, gender equity, specifically estimates the level of 
discrimination against women. Included in this subindex are data on gender 
health, educational, and wage disparities, as well as data on the norms of 
discrimination that sustain these over time, such as the proportion of managers 
who believe men have more right to a job than women, or the proportion of 
parents who believe that boys should be prioritised in access to education. The 
second area, inter-group cohesion, reflects the extent of social conflict among 
ethnic, religious, or other social identity groups. It is measured by data such as 
ratings on the level of ethnic and religious tensions as well as the number of 
riots, assassinations, and acts of terrorism. The third area is crime and personal 
trust. Included in this subindex are data on citizens' trust in their society, 
neighbors, and community, data on crime victimization, and data on homicide 
and other acts of interpersonal aggression. The fourth area, strength of 
community, and measures the level of engagement in local associations and 
networks. Strength of community is measured using data on levels of 
engagement in local voluntary associations, time spent socializing in 
community groups, and membership of developmental organizations. Finally, 
the fifth area is the level of civic engagement, which measures the extent to 
which social practices encourage more active and critical engagement with 
political authorities. The strength of civil society is measured using survey data 
on participation in civic activities such as petitions or marches, access to media 
through newspaper and radio, and the density of international civil society 
organizations. 
 
Why do these measures of social institutions act a form of 'capital'? 
They do so, because they facilitate the exchange of goods and information 
through their effect in reducing transaction costs. Norms of inclusion and non-
discrimination, for example, serve to reduce the distortions in the labor market 
that are introduced by arbitrary exclusion of ethnic or other minorities. 
Likewise, norms of gender equity also enhance allocative efficiency, allowing 
women to translate human and economic capital into returns in the workplace. 
Crime and low social trust impose additional monitoring and enforcement 
costs in economic life, potentially inhibiting exchanges that might otherwise 
have occurred, while the presence of systemic intergroup violence, even below 
the level of open civil conflict, can have a similar effect. Finally, the norms that 
enable collective action, whether in the local community or in the nation as a 
whole, facilitate public goods provision, the exchange of information among 
individuals and between citizens and the public service providers. The general 
effect of social capital is therefore to reduce transaction costs, whether 
between transacting parties in the private sector, or between public service 
providers and citizens.  
 
For the purposes of empirical testing, the five subindices are combined 
into a single variable reflective of the 'stock' of social capital in that society. 
This is done by summing the standardized score for each subindex, weighted 
by the average correlation between that subindex and the others (pairwise 
correlations used in the weighting schema are shown in Table 1.0). The full 
five subindices were available for 85 countries, yielding an initial 85 scores, and 
to ensure the efficient use of information, we also impute social capital scores 
for an additional 74 countries for which between 3 and 5 subindices were 
available. This yields a total of 159 country observations for the composite 
social capital variable.  
 
TABLE 1.0 
 Correlation Between Sub-Indices Used in the Social Capital Index 
 
 
Civic Activism 
Interpersonal 
Safety and 
Trust 
Intergroup 
Cohesion 
Clubs and 
Associations 
Gender 
Equity 
 
Civic Activism 1     
Interpersonal Safety and Trust 0.5836 1    
Intergroup Cohesion 0.590   0.4154 1   
Clubs and Associations 0.0915 -0.067 -0.1029 1  
Gender Equity 0.5755 0.2397 0.5638 -.1438 1 
      
 
 
The model basically represents the residual as a function of human capital 
within the nation and abroad and social capital expressed as institutional 
quality. The per capita years of schooling of the working population is to 
capture domestic human capital and remittances by those outside the country.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We use Cobb-Douglas function: 
 
R = AS
α
S
 F
α
F
 P
α
I 
 
R = Intangible residual 
A = Constant 
S = Years of Schooling per worker 
F = Remittances from Abroad 
P = Social Capital 
αs = Elasticity of the residual 
 
4  Empirical Results 
The result of the regression analysis shown in Table 2 reveals that our 
independent variables explain 88 percent variation in the residual. The result 
indicates goodness of fit of the model evaluated by means of the adjusted r2 
(0.88).The coefficients for all three independent variables are positive and 
different from zero at the 95% confidence interval. The coefficient of school 
years suggests that a 1 percent increase in school years will increase the 
intangible capital by 0.47 percent. Whereas 1 percent increase in remittance 
from abroad will increase intangible capital by 0.14 percent. Out of three 
variables selected, social capital however shows the most significant association 
with the intangible capital residual. The estimation shows that a 1 percent 
increase in the stock of social capital results in a 1.10 percent increase in 
intangible capital. However, coefficients lower than one indicates decreasing 
marginal returns. The negative dummy coefficients support the general 
assumption that low-income, middle-income, and upper-middle income 
countries possess lower levels of intangible residual capital.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 2.0 
Elasticities of IC with Schooling, Remittances and Social Capital 
LIC 
-2.346 
(0.445)*** 
LMI 
-1.69  
(0.342)*** 
UMI 
-1.316 
(0.315)*** 
log social capital 
16.182  
(6.056)** 
log schooling 
0.470  
(0.215)* 
log remittances 
0.139 
(0.048)** 
constant 
-22.468  
(12.434) 
  
  
N 74 
adj. r
2
 0.88 
  
 
 
Marginal Returns to 
Schooling 
Marginal Returns 
to Social Capital 
Marginal Returns 
to Remittances 
    
Low Income countries 903 127 17 
Lower Middle Income countries 1,723 412 15 
Upper Middle Income countries 2,537 547 84 
High Income OECD 15,805 3,274 153 
    
 
 
 4.1  Country Case Studies 
 
Country examples can increase our intuitive understanding of the 
decomposition of intangible wealth. In this section, we illustrate the relative 
contributions of human capital, social capital, and remittances to national 
wealth by comparing three landlocked, low-income countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa: Mali, Rwanda, and Lesotho. While all three share important 
characteristics and have substantial intangible capital residuals, these residuals 
can be explained by the different relative endowments of the three countries. 
This can be seen from table 3.0, which decomposes the intangible capital 
residual for each of the three cases. 
 
FIGURE 1 
 Decomposition of Intangible Capital 
Schooling, 
35%
Social Capital, 
57%
Remittances, 
7%
 
 
TABLE 3.0 
 
Country 
Income 
per 
capita 
($) 
Intangible 
residual 
(% GNI) 
Shares of residual (%) Levels 
schooling 
social 
capital Remittances 
Schooling 
     (yrs) 
social 
capital 
remittances 
($ per capita) 
         
Rwanda 226 54% 54 45 1 3 15 2 
Mali 208 47% 13 82 5 1 40 18 
Lesotho 480 76% 25 33 42 4 40 393 
 
 
Mali, a landlocked Sahelian country in West Africa, is the poorest among the 
three countries with a per capita income of just $208. Nonetheless, the country 
has an intangible capital residual that accounts for about half of per capita 
wealth. Of this, over four-fifths (82%) rests in the country‟s stock of social 
capital, and one-eighth (13%) in the country‟s human capital. From among the 
six social development subindices, Mali scores strongly on local community 
and on intergroup cohesion, and has a strong civil society relative to other 
countries of a similar economic level. Intergroup cohesion has helped avert the 
kind of civil conflict experienced by neighboring states such as Niger or Cote 
d‟Ivoire, while civic engagement has since 1991 supported a successful process 
of democratization. Stability and openness may in part explain the country‟s 
strong 5% annual rate of growth since 1994. The estimates here suggest that 
growth might be yet stronger still, were there a higher degree of human capital; 
at present, the average citizen experiences just one year of schooling. 
 
Rwanda, a small landlocked country in central Africa, has a similar 
GDP per capita to Mali, estimated at $226. Yet the country has a very different 
distribution between social and human capital. Social capital accounts for only 
45% of the residual, while schooling account for 54%. A country with a 
historically centralized but very effective state, Rwanda‟s human capital is result 
of a comprehensive system of primary education that has raised average years 
of schooling to 3 years per capita – about treble the level found in Mali. Yet 
Rwanda has a very low stock of social capital. On the index used in this paper, 
Rwanda has a score of just 15, compared to 40 in Mali. 17 years after a 
genocide that killed 15 per cent of the country‟s population, Rwanda remains a 
country plagued by low social trust, disputes over justice and land rights, and 
disengagement from civil society (Human Rights Watch, 2007). The primary 
medium-term growth risk in Rwanda remains political instability from ethnic 
insurgency. Efforts to enhance national unity, equitable growth, and justice and 
reconciliation will remain central in bolstering the country‟s long-run growth 
prospects.  
 
Lesotho - also a small, landlocked country in Sub-Saharan Africa – is 
by far the richest of the three countries, with a per capita GDP of $480 in 
2000. However, as our decomposition of the intangible capital residual shows, 
this is not due to higher levels of social or human capital. Levels of average 
schooling, at 4 years per capita, are similar to Rwanda, while the stock of social 
capital is comparable to Mali. By contrast, the country‟s relatively greater 
wealth is entirely a product of the large inflow of remittances from abroad: the 
average Mosotho receives $393 per capita a year in remittances, primarily from 
Basotho working as miners in neighboring South Africa. Consequently, 
remittances account for 42% of Lesotho‟s stock of intangible capital, 
compared to less than 5 per cent in Mali or Rwanda. 
 
These findings suggest very different possibilities for raising the stock 
of intangible capital in developing countries that face geographical restraints. 
Mali has clearly achieved nascent growth through its stock of social capital. 
Ethnic cohesion, civic engagement, and community development have in turn 
ensured political stability, accountability, and the better management of 
collective resources, and these factors have sustained productivity increases in 
agriculture, fishing, and mining over the course of the last decade. The example 
suggests that a similar level of cohesion in a country such as Rwanda would 
yield a large marginal gain, by creating the expectations of stability and 
transparency that enable sustained (physical) capital accumulation. On the 
other hand, Rwanda, unlike Mali, has attained a level of state organization that 
is unusual for a low-income country, and this has enabled sustained investment 
in primary education and skills. Provided the country can maintain its current 
political stability, this stock of human capital will constitute a vital resource that 
can be leveraged to support growth through technology transfer and improved 
quality in management and administration. Finally, Lesotho has achieved 
important secondary growth by relying on an migrant labor force that brings 
substantial remittances home every year to their dependents within the 
country. The key challenge for such a country is to channel this inflow into 
expenditures that will support long-run sustainable growth within the country; 
this in turn will in no small degree this will involve solving domestic political 
and social conflicts which inhibit inward investment and domestic job creation. 
The outbreak of violence after disputed elections in 1998, for example, led to 
widespread destruction and disinvestment, and in part this instability is the 
consequence of a weak civil society, which if stronger would help build 
political consensus, reduce elite capture, and foster transparency. The social 
development indices give a very low civil society score for Lesotho, and 
strengthening the conduits between citizens and the state would help 
approximate the peaceful political transition seen in a country such as Mali. 
 
5  Conclusion 
 
This paper represents an addition to the relatively sparse literature on 
intangible capital. We argue that cross-country differences in intangible capital 
stock may be explained by differences in human and social capital. The 
evidence provided by this study helps policymakers by showing that intangible 
capital is among the fundamental determinants of the developmental status of 
countries, and consequent success in poverty reduction. The major hurdle that 
developing nations face today is their lower stock of intangible capital and the 
inability to convert human and social capital into revenue, cost savings and 
other forms of tangible benefits.  
 
 The intangible residual obtained from the wealth estimates has 
provided researchers with an opportunity to carry out cross-country valuation 
of human and social capital. In our study, by decomposing the intangible 
wealth residual, we have tried to highlight the importance of social capital, 
remittances, and years of schooling.  Developing countries with lower stock of 
human and social capital can produce high levels of out put per worker in the 
long run and work to reduce poverty by investing in education and 
improvement of institutional quality. 
 
As a result of our analysis, we find that among the most important 
aspects of intangible wealth is social capital – the norms and networks that 
reduce transaction costs and enable collective action. Social trust, non-
discrimination, cohesion across social and ethnic groups, and engagement in 
civic and community associations are all important dimensions of this stock, 
and together account for 57% of the world‟s intangible capital. By serving to 
reduce transaction costs, these institutions facilitate processes of production, 
exchange, and the provision of public goods. Social trust, for example, ensures 
the maintenance of informal, non-legally binding agreements; non-
discrimination enables individuals to enter into contracts of work or exchange 
with those of differing backgrounds or beliefs; and intergroup cohesion 
ensures the continuity of institutions and therefore the expectations upon 
which investment and negotiation decisions are made. We are a long way from 
a complete knowledge of the policies that serve to build up or deplete social 
capital stocks over time, yet by recognizing the place of social capital in 
contributing to societal wealth, we can make an important contribution 
towards showing how long-term social effects can be factored into cost-benefit 
analyses of programs and projects. 
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